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Abstract 
Consciousness exists, or so it seems most of the time. 
However, consciousness is unlike car keys or cellphone in 
that it is not located at a specific point in space and time. 
The applicability of physical laws like gravity seems moot 
at best when it comes to consciousness. What is desirable 
is an explanation of consciousness that allows it to exist 
and be part of the very same reality as the car-key or the 
cellphone, a ‘philosophy of immanence’ as Gilles Deleuze 
would put it.  The author prefers a view that construes 
consciousness as causally-efficacious (having material 
effects upon one’s body in real-time) and metaphysically 
separate from the brain. In essence, to say that the mind is 
metaphysically separate from the brain is to deny the 
proposition that there is nothing more to our subjective 
experience of mind than the mere activity of the physical 
brain. This paper looks at a view proposed by John Searle 
and tries to show that there are empirical problems with a 
consciousness that is causally inefficacious (unable to cause 
material changes) and metaphysically identical (not separate 
from the brain). 
Keywords: consciousness, causality, identity, metaphysical 
reduction, ontological reduction, non-reductive physicalism 
1.Introduction 
Dualism has it that consciousness is part of a reality that is distinct 
from the ‘physical’ world that surrounds us. There is a duality of 
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realities according to this view, one of the “mental” realm and the 
other of the “physical”. Monism, on the other hand, says that there 
is just one realm. Two strands emerge out of the monist view - one 
is physicalism that sides with the scientifically and objectively 
observable physical world and another is idealism on the side of a 
purely mental world of subjective consciousness. This essay 
concerns a middle path, a non-reductive physicalism - one which is 
physicalist in its outlook - that is it thinks of (experienced) 
consciousness as no more than the neural activity of the brain- but 
at the same time also grants consciousness an existence as a thing in 
itself albeit without causal efficacy - epiphenomenological. The 
logic behind attributing ‘epiphenomenality’ (or causal inefficacy) to 
consciousness is that whatever we previously thought that 
consciousness was causally responsible for can now (given 
increasing neuro-scientific knowledge) be reduced to the physical 
activity of the brain. The logic behind attributing ‘existence’ to 
consciousness is simply that our experience of consciousness is too 
real to deny it outrightly. A non-reductive physicalist takes 
consciousness to be real and ontologically irreducible (to be 
counted amongst all other things that exist in the world), 
nevertheless inefficacious (without causal function) and 
metaphysically identical (nothing more than neural-activity).  
One non-reductive physicalist is John Searle, who proposes a 
theory called ‘Biological Naturalism’. It claims that (1) our’s is a 
physical world that is structured - has lower and higher-level 
features - consisting of physical particles and forces at the 
fundamental level (2) and among the higher-level features of the 
world is consciousness that is causally dependent on the behaviour 
of lower-level elements. (Searle, 2007) 
I argue against such a construal of consciousness because 
consciousness has causal functions that are not satisfactorily 
explained by the physical neural processes alone. In this essay, the 
author develops an analytical critique of the non-reductive 
physicalism.  
Consider a set of H20 molecules that constitute the property ‘being 
liquid’ (in water) or solid (in ice) when organized in some system 
where, say, the molecules either roll over each other (in case of 
water) or form lattice structures (in case of ice). According to Searle 
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(1995), such a property of either ‘being liquid’ or ‘being solid’ is 
caused by and realized in a causally interacting system. The 
molecules interact with each other in a certain way thereby causing 
the system to behave as liquid or solid.  
Now, consider the same set of H2O molecules and note that they 
constitute another property 'being water’ without being in any 
causally interacting system. Empirically, ‘being water’ just is ‘being 
H2O’. One might say, being ice is also just being H2O and the same 
applies to steam. All are equally true, the distinction between the 
three forms of liquid, solid and gaseous lie not in their constituent 
element (same in all three ‘H2O) but in their “appearance” (as 
liquid or solid) constituted by the causally interacting system (the 
particular way in which the molecules interact). The properties 
‘being water’ and ‘being liquid’ are clearly not identical (same as 
each other): a thing can be H2O without being liquid (like ice) and a 
thing can be liquid without being H2O (like mercury). Searle (2007) 
accepts this non-identity between the properties ‘being water’ and 
‘being liquid’.  
The distinction between the apparent feature, say, ‘being liquid’ 
and the reality ‘being water’ (which instantiates the apparent 
feature) is important because it allows us to reduce the apparent 
feature to the lower level without having any implications on 
reality. We can naturally reduce the property of being ‘liquid’ to 
the causally interacting microphysical system without reducing the 
property of being ‘water’. In the case of consciousness, however, its 
appearance is its reality (Searle, 2007).  This nuanced understanding 
of water that distinguishes its appearance from its reality allows us 
to conceptualize the metaphysics of matters other than water, say, 
consciousness. However, consciousness is not like water, in fact, it 
is unlike most things that exist in our world. In the case of 
consciousness, its very appearance is its reality. We know of 
consciousness only through its appearance to us - there are no 
objective tools or methods to bring consciousness to the fore, say, 
on a petridish under a microscope. The very essence of 
consciousness is realized in its appearance to the subject’s mind. 
Searle has three major commitments in regard to consciousness: 
‘causal emergence’, ‘causal reduction’ and ‘ontological 
irreducibility’.  




The reducibility of the property ‘being liquid’ to a causally 
interacting system makes it a “causally-emergent” property. Searle 
calls it causally emergent because the property that is reducible to 
the interacting system is not reducible to any of its individual 
constituent parts. The property ‘being liquid’ is not reducible to a 
single molecule but only to a set of molecules in a certain 
interaction. Analogously, for Searle (1992), consciousness is 
reducible to the neurophysical processes but not to any individual 
neuron; it is causally-emergent. 
B.Causal Reducibility 
The property ‘being liquid’ seems to have causal properties that 
‘being solid’ does not have; for example, ‘liquid’ can flow. But all 
causal powers such as the property of flowing ascribed to ‘being 
liquid’ are explainable in terms of the underlying microphysical 
system. In other words, ‘being liquid’ has no novel causal 
properties other than those possessed by its underlying 
microphysical system. For Searle (1992), consciousness has no 
novel causal powers; it is causally reducible.   
C.Ontological Irreducibility (standard version - not Searle’s) 
There are properties that can be ascribed to ‘water in a liquid state’ 
that cannot be ascribed to either individual microphysical elements 
of water or to the causally interacting system per se. ‘Water in a 
liquid state’ has the causal property of quenching my thirst, while 
neither an H2O molecule by itself nor the causally interacting 
system of something other than H2O has the same causal property. 
The quenching of my thirst is an emergent property on the property 
‘being water in liquid state’. A property is genuinely ontologically 
irreducible (or ontologically emergent) only if it is also causally 
irreducible. Kim’s Alexander’s dictum says “for something to be 
real, it needs to have causal powers” (Kim, 1992, p. 134). If it is true 
that the mark of an ontologically real thing is that it has novel 
causal powers, then for consciousness to be ontologically real it 
must be causally irreducible (have novel causal powers). 
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4.Ontological Irreducibility (Searle’s ‘metaphysically trivial’ 
version) 
Searle subscribes to what is called ‘weak emergence’. 
Epistemological or weak emergence claims that the higher level of 
reality (like consciousness) is just a level of description, 
metaphysically and causally identical to the lower level (no more 
than neural activity in the case of consciousness). Admitting things 
like consciousness into some ontology (a list of things that 
definitively exist in the world) has no metaphysical implications. 
Consciousness, for Searle (2007), is irreducible for “trivial reasons.”  
By ‘trivial’ he means that consciousness, since it cannot have causal 
efficacy in the material world, has no meaningful grounds on 
which it can claim metaphysical separateness from the brain.  
I’ll now state what I think is obvious (perhaps even redundant) as 
my capsule-version argument, unpacking it in the rest of the essay: 
I. an ontologically real object, like water or wood, can either 
have casual properties identical to the causally interacting 
microphysical level or have novel causal properties (not 
reducible to the micophysical level). Having novel causal 
properties amounts to genuine ontological irreducibility - 
like we saw in the case of ‘water in a liquid state’ quenching 
my thirst (going by Kim’s ‘Alexander’s Dictum’). Having 
identical causal properties to the lower level amounts to 
causal reduction - the property of ‘flowing’ in liquid can be 
easily reduced to the causally interacting system. If flowing 
water causes a thing to float we can be sure that the 
molecular interaction between the flowing thing and 
floating thing make the floating possible. It is clear that this 
is an either/or case between being causally irreducible  
thusontological irreducible) and causally reducible, but 
Searle tries to have both at once.  
II. For an apparent feature, like the property of being ‘liquid’ 
or ‘solid’, having novel causal properties is to be causally 
irreducible. However, having identical causal properties to 
the lower level amounts to both causal and ontological 
reduction to the lower level (the apparent property of 
‘flowing’ and all its causal efficacy is no more than the 
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causally interacting system). This too is clearly an either/or 
case, meaning if ‘not causally irreducible’ (not having novel 
causal powers) then ‘ontological reduction’ (not a thing in 
itself) follows.  
This is why I think causal reducibility should be given up in the 
case of consciousness, given that its appearance is its reality. I agree 
with Kim when he says, “in an attempt to explain mental causation, 
[reductionism] all but banishes the very mentality it was out to 
save.” (Kim, 1995, p. 194). 
The growing influence of physical sciences (within and outside of 
philosophy) vigilantly defends against any possibility of what is 
called ‘overdetermination’. Overdetermination simply is the case of 
one effect with more than one immediate cause: so if a ball is 
thrown in the air with some force, its only cause must be (according 
to physical sciences) the force of the thrower’s hand and its 
physical movements. Trying to attach another force as the 
immediate cause of the event leads to overdetermination - a 
(physical) impossibility. Another concept is equally well guarded 
by the influence of physical sciences, that of ‘physical closure’. The 
concept of ‘physical closure’ maintains that a physical effect must 
have a physical cause. Any non-physical cause (like consciousness) 
is not permitted to enter the loop of causality. 
Now since Searle rhetorically asks and answers, “But are you 
saying that the conscious state itself has electrical charges and has 
spatial dimensions in the brain?... obviously yes” (Searle, 2007, p. 
176) there are two questions worth asking. (1) wouldn’t causal 
efficacy of the mental (if it is indeed a part of the causal chain and 
so ontologically irreducible) require that it has some property that 
is causally relevant (does the causal work) without invoking 
overdetermination?  (2) Is it possible for something non-material to 
possess material properties, or for a non-material property to be 
causally relevant without violating physical closure?  
Searle answers the first question by positing causal reducibility of 
consciousness to the neurophysical brain.     
“..the reason consciousness can function causally in a ‘‘physical” 
world is that it has physical properties. Every conscious state is 
realized in a certain physical structure in the brain and has the 
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conscious powers of all of these physical structures.” (Searle, 2007, 
p. 176) 
To answer the second question, about causal relevance without 
violating ‘closure’, Searle takes a longer route. He makes a list of 
material things like ontological objectivity, quantitative 
measurability, spatial location and so on. He then contrasts this list 
with the features of consciousness, like ontological subjectivity, 
qualitativeness, intentionality, and others. Such a contrast makes it 
clear that in no way can consciousness, without spatiality or any 
physical features, function causally in a physical world. But 
evidently, consciousness does have causal efficacy, in the form of 
what Searle calls intention-in-action, and to bridge this intuitive 
gap Searle gets rid of the contrast itself. Once the opposing 
terminologies “material” and “mental” are done away with, we 
have exactly one ontological domain that consists of both, the 
features of consciousness and their (neuro)physical counterparts. 
Searle suggests that all the non-material features of consciousness, 
rightly classified, are ‘physical’, and so they may be causally 
efficacious,“ without violating the causal closure, 
overdetermination, epiphenomenalism or any other paradoxes.” 
(Searle, 1995, p. 219)  
If these are Searle’s answers to (1) and (2), then the circular 
reasoning in them must be pointed out which render his arguments 
futile; (according to Searle) consciousness can be causally 
efficacious because it has physical properties and since 
consciousness can be classified as physical, there is no problem 
with it having causally relevant properties. If this reasoning is 
granted to Searle then the following can be inferred from his 
“causal reducibility” proposition: consciousness is causally 
efficacious so far as it is physical, and since all the causal work 
attributed to consciousness is sufficiently explained by the 
workings of the brain, consciousness is causally reducible in so far as 
it is metaphysically identical to the brain. Overlooking this circular 
reasoning in Searle is an option that should not be available to us or 
even Searle himself. This is another clue that the pursuit of drawing 
up a consciousness without causal efficacy should be given up.   
This section argues in favour of the non-reducibility of causal 
powers. Most philosophers recognize that “in the mind–body 
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problem three players are on the scene, not two; they are [mental 
states], the brain, and behaviour.” (Kim, 2006, p. 195) 
According to Searle, consciousness has intentionality which is 
intrinsically connected to action, “Intentionality is directedness and 
intending to do something is just one kind of Intentionality among 
others.” (Searle,  1980,  pg. 3) ‘Intentional content’ is the 
intentionality directed towards the objects in the world and 
‘intentional components’ are feelings like desire and belief with 
which intentional content is presented. Searle explains ‘intentional 
components’ by reposing Wittgenstein’s question: If I raise my arm, 
what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm went up?” What 
is left over is the ‘intentional component’ which involves “certain 
feelings and bodily sensations.”  
‘Intentionality’ has phenomenal and logical properties; a 
phenomenal property is simply the feeling of believing, desiring or 
intending, and a logical property is the condition of satisfaction for 
that belief to come true, desire to come to pass or intention to have 
a corresponding action performed (Searle, 1980). My ‘seeing a red 
apple’, for example, has the phenomenal property of ‘redness’, 
‘roundness’, etc., and the logical property of being caused by (there 
being) a red round apple present in my field of view. The 
movement to perform some action, in order for that movement to 
count as action per se, must satisfy the condition of self-
referentiality, the logical property of being (movement, in this case) 
caused by there being the intention to perform that very action.  
Searle suggests that a phenomenal property (say, the belief that I) 
with the logical property (say, am thirsty) is ‘caused by and realized 
in’ the brain, and so causally reducible to the neurophysical 
processes. The problem, as I see it, is that neurophysical processes 
alone cannot explain action if a movement to genuinely count as 
action must satisfy a logical self-referentiality condition of ‘being 
caused by there being’. 
If I am feeling thirsty and need to drink water, for my movement 
(towards the kitchen or wherever the water is) to count as action, 
that movement must be caused by the very intention of drinking 
water. Movement, however, consists of several constituent 
intentions like intention to ‘move in a certain direction’, ‘at a certain 
Vaghela                                           A Priori Problems with the Metaphysical  
25 
 
speed’, ‘in a certain way’ and so on. These constituent movements 
do not necessarily satisfy the logical condition of being directly 
caused by the intention of drinking water, since they are subject to 
change or modification. Upon feeling thirsty I may start walking 
towards the kitchen thinking that the water is in the kitchen, but 
will change the direction of my movement if on my way I am 
reminded of the fact that the water in the bedroom. This change in 
movement does not mean a change in action or a change in 
intention. The ‘being caused by being there’ condition of this 
change in movement is not water or even the feeling of thirst, 
instead, it is simply the knowledge of the location of water.     
Fred Dretske’s passage reiterates my point: “After all, the dog is 
here and the tree is there; surely the cat's knowledge of this fact is 
relevant to why it runs in a certain direction. Its genes and 
hormones won't help us explain this aspect of the cat's flight 
however much they help us to understand why cats are afraid of 
dogs or why they tend to run in such situations.” (Dretske, 1988, p. 
32) 
To explicate the point further, take the same cat and put her in a 
more testing (similar but distinct) situation, say, it realizes midway 
that the thing it was running towards (thinking it is a tree), is just 
another weird-looking dog. That cat’s coming to knowledge about 
this new information must surely be relevant to her revised 
direction of flight. In both Dretske's example and my version of it, 
the cat’s phenomenal property must be the same viz. ‘fear’, and 
also the logical property corresponding to that fear must be the 
same viz. ‘dogs’. However the physical movement in both 
examples will be different because of its constituent parts. 
Neurophysical processes may account for movement as action 
against the backdrop of a specific intention, but that is only too 
rigid a formulation of movement because it has constituent parts 
that are subject to sudden and almost intuitive change and 
modification.  
By a causal reduction to neurophysical processes we are restricted 
to an explanation of materially physical movements alone and lose 
out an explanation of non-material aspects of action. 
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Searle concludes his essay ‘Dualism Revisited’ with the following 
argument: 
1. Materialism says truly that there is only a physical world 
made of physical particles in fields of force and says 
falsely that consciousness, as irreducible, qualitative 
subjectivity, does not exist. 
2. Dualism says truly that consciousness is irreducible as 
qualitative subjectivity i.e. cannot be reduced to a third-
person phenomenon and says falsely that irreducible 
consciousness is something over and above the physical 
world. 
3. Thus, taking what is said truly and leaving what is said 
falsely, consciousness exists as a real, irreducible 
phenomenon [as subjectivity] in the physical world but 
not as something over and above the physical world. 
Given that the appearance of consciousness is its reality, the 
appearance is deemed irreducible because its reduction implies a 
reduction of its reality. If so, then two questions naturally arise: 
“what property does its reality constitute of in virtue of which it 
cannot be reduced?” and, “what property does the appearance 
constitute of in virtue of which it should not be reduced?” The 
answer to both these questions, since appearance is reality in case 
of consciousness, must be the same.  
If Searle wants to claim that consciousness is ontologically 
irreducible (a thing in itself) while also being metaphysically 
identical to (nothing over and above) the brain processes he must 
give us at least one property that can be ascribed to consciousness 
but not to the brain processes. That property, according to Searle, is 
subjectivity. Naturally, subjectivity or first-person-ness is a 
property attributable to consciousness but not its underlying 
neurophysical processes. However, if the appearance of 
consciousness truly just is the reality of consciousness then Searle 
must also point out a property common to both in virtue of which 
they must not be ontologically reduced. Searle fails at this 
important task of pointing out a common property: to the 
appearance of consciousness Searle says it has subjectivity and to 
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the reality of consciousness Searle says it has physical dimensions 
in the brain.  
If this is the case then Searle’s view admits to the proposition that 
the appearance of consciousness is not the very same thing as its 
reality. Searle, I assume, will not want to take this lane which goes 
down towards dualism, a disaster at the least. 
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